

Securely Solving Simple Combinatorial Graph Problems

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Motivation

We investigate the problem of securely solving graph problems:

- ▶ in a multi-party setting,
- ▶ when the knowledge of the graph is distributed.

Example of applications include:

- ▶ privacy-preserving GPS guidance,
- ▶ privacy-preserving determination of topological features in social networks,
- ▶ privacy-preserving benchmarks between competing network operators.



Contributions

New protocols for securely solving graph problems.

- ▶ The shortest path problem:

	Original	Secret weights	Secret structure
Bellman-Ford	$ V E $	$ V E $	$ V ^3$
Dijkstra	$ V ^2$	$ V ^3$	$ V ^3$

- ▶ The maximum flow problem:

	Original	Secret weights	Secret structure
Edmonds-Karp	$ V E ^2$	$ V E ^2$	$ V ^5$
Push-Relabel	$ V ^3$	$ V ^2 E $	$ V ^4$



Challenges

Challenges related to securely solving graph problems.

- ▶ **Leakage by execution flow:** running time, memory addressing, ... usually depend on the data that are manipulated.
- ▶ **Different efficiency metrics:** The traditional complexity metrics do not transpose to secure computations.
- ▶ **Composability:** The algorithm should leak no partial solution.



Challenge 1

Leakage by execution flow: running time, memory addressing, ... usually depend on the data that are manipulated.




Challenge 1

Leakage by execution flow: running time, memory addressing, ... usually depend on the data that are manipulated.


Dijkstra's algorithm maintains for each vertex:

- ▶ the status (unreached, labelled, scanned),
- ▶ the current previous vertex,
- ▶ the current distance.




Leakage by execution flow

Dijkstra's first iteration:




Dijkstra's second iteration:



We need to hide the scanning sequence.



We consider a complete graph to preserve privacy!



Challenge 2

Different efficiency metrics: The traditional complexity metrics do not transpose to secure computations.

One comparison costs more than 100 multiplications.



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Complexity for a graph with V vertices and E edges:

Dijkstra's complexity:


- ▶ $O(V^2)$ comparisons
- ▶ $O(V^3)$ multiplications

Bellman-Ford's complexity:

- ▶ $O(V \cdot E)$ comparisons
- ▶ $O(V \cdot E)$ multiplications



Number of multiplications for Dijkstra's algorithm



The dashed lines highlight the quadratic then cubic growths.



Challenge 3

Composability: The algorithm should leak no partial solution.



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
The maximum flow algorithm makes use of the secure shortest path (which cannot leak any partial information).

Brickell and Shmatikov proposed a shortest path solution that revealed a part of the solution at each step. [BS05]




Edmonds-Karp's algorithm

Find the smallest augmenting path in the residual graph in $O(E)$



Edmonds-Karp's algorithm

Find the smallest augmenting path in the residual graph in $O(E)$



Number of steps is at most E , length of path is at most $V - 1$



Secure Maximum Flow based on Edmonds-Karp

- ▶ dynamic search of the smallest augmenting path is tricky
- ▶ hide the length of the paths
- ▶ keep the time of execution reasonable




Secure solution for the Maximum Flow

Consider all the paths (sorted) *even if they are not augmenting!*

- ▶ ~~dynamic search of the smallest augmenting path is tricky~~
- ▶ ~~hide the length of the paths~~
- ▶ keep the time of execution reasonable



Results for the secure Maximum Flow



The number of paths has to be small: $< E^2$



Conclusion

Our investigation raised interesting complexity gaps between centralized algorithms and secure protocols.

Further work:

- ▶ Design efficient datastructures (for example priority queues [Toft12]),
- ▶ Trade secure comparisons for cheaper arithmetic operations.



Thank you for your attention!

